

NANCY DELANEY CARTWRIGHT FBA FAcSS

Professor: Department of Philosophy, University of California at San Diego
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Citizenship: USA, UK

Married: Sir Stuart Hampshire (deceased)

EDUCATION

- PhD, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, Philosophy. Dissertation: "Philosophical Analysis of the Concept of Mixture in Quantum Mechanics" (Fellowships: Carnegie, Danforth, Woodrow Wilson)
- BSc, University of Pittsburgh, Mathematics, *Summa cum laude*

CURRENT POSITIONS

- Professor, Department of Philosophy, Durham University, UK (since 2012)
- Distinguished Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of California at San Diego (since 1998)
- Co-Director, Centre for Humanities Engaging Science and Society (CHESS), Durham University (since 2012)
- Tsing Hua Honorary Distinguished Chair Professor, National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan
- Research Associate, Institute for the Future of Knowledge, University of Johannesburg
- Senior Research Associate, Department of Philosophy under Humanities, Auckland Park Kingsway Campus, University of Johannesburg

PREVIOUS ACADEMIC POSITIONS

- Visiting Research Fellow, Ca' Foscari University, Venice
- Professor of Philosophy, London School of Economics
- Director, LSE Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science
- Chair, LSE Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science
- Short Term Visiting Professor, Philosophy, Oslo University (x3)
- Senior Philosophy Visitor, Pitzer and Pomona Colleges
- Visiting Professor, Humanities, California Institute of Technology
- Assistant - Full Professor, Philosophy, Stanford University
- Visiting Professor, Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh

- Visiting Associate Professor, Philosophy, Princeton University
- Visiting Assistant Professor, Philosophy, UCLA
- Visiting Lecturer, Cambridge University
- Assistant Professor, Philosophy, University of Maryland

FELLOWSHIPS AND HONOURS

- The Du Châtelet Prize in Philosophy of Physics 2023 for a winning essay to be given in honour of 'How the Laws of Physics Lie' by Nancy Cartwright
- Barcelona Hypatia European Science Prize Hypatia Award Lecture, 33rd Annual Conference of Academia Europaea (AE), Building Bridges 2022, Barcelona
- External Faculty Member of the Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) of the University of Amsterdam
- President, Division for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science & Technology of the International Union for History and Philosophy of Science & Technology (DLMPST/IUHPST)
- Carl Gustav Hempel Award 2018, Philosophy of Science Association
- Distinguished Alumni Fellow Award, University of Pittsburgh
- Fellow, Academy of the Social Sciences, London
- Member, Academia Europaea
- Associate Member, Nuffield College, Oxford
- Senior Research Associate, African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (ACEPS), University of Johannesburg
- The Martin R. Lebowitz Prize for Philosophical Achievement of the Phi Beta Kappa Society 2017 (alongside Elliott Sober)
- Associate Member, Senior Common Room at Wadham College, Oxford
- 225 Medallion, Distinguished Alumna, University of Pittsburgh
- Honorary Degree, Doctor of Letters, honoris causa, University of St Andrews
- Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, London School of Economics
- Honorary Degree, Doctor of Humane Letters, honoris causa, Southern Methodist University
- Member, Doctorate School in Philosophy of the Università "Ca' Foscari", Venice
- Research Associate, Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS), London School of Economics
- President, American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division)
- President, Philosophy of Science Association
- Chancellor's Associates Faculty Award for Excellence in Research, UCSD

- Titular Member, Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences (A.I.P.S.)
- Fellow, Institute for Advanced Study, Durham University
- Senior Visiting Fellow, Institute for Advanced Studies, University of Bologna
- Fellow, American Philosophical Society
- Associate Member, Nuffield College, Oxford
- Foreign Honorary Member, American Academy of Arts and Science
- Member, Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina (The German National Academy of Natural Science)
- Fellow, British Academy
- Old Dominion Fellow, Philosophy, Princeton University
- Long-term Member of Common Room, Wolfson College, Oxford
- Fellow, MacArthur Foundation
- Fellow, Wissenschaftskolleg (Institute for Advanced Study), Berlin
- Fellow, Philosophy of Science Center, University of Pittsburgh
- Fellow, ZIF (Center for Interdisciplinary Research), Bielefeld, Germany
- Fellow, Philosophy of Science Centre, University of Pittsburgh
- Postdoctoral Fellow, U.S. National Science Foundation, Cambridge University

PUBLICATIONS

BOOKS

1. Cartwright, N., Munro, E. and Pemberton, J. (Forthcoming). *Causal Processes and their Warrant: A Practical Guide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Cartwright, N., Hardie, J., Montuschi, E., Soleiman, M. and Thresher, A. (2022). *The Tangle of Science: Reliability Beyond the Scientific Method, Rigour, and Objectivity*. Oxford University Press.
3. Cartwright, N. (2022). *A Philosopher Looks at Science*. Cambridge University Press.
4. Cartwright, N. (2019). *Nature the Artful Modeler: Lectures on Laws, Science, How Nature Arranges the World, and How We Can Arrange It Better*. The 2017 Carus Lectures. Open Court, Chicago.
5. Munro, E., Cartwright, N., Hardie, J. and Montuschi, E. (2017). *Improving Child Safety: deliberation, judgement and empirical research*. Durham: Centre for Humanities Engaging Science and Society (CHESS).
6. Cartwright, N. (2013). *Evidence: For Policy and Wheresoever Rigor is a Must*. London: LSE.
7. Cartwright, N. and Hardie, J. (2012). *Evidence Based Policy: A Practical Guide to Doing it Better*. New York: Oxford University Press.
8. Cartwright, N. (2007). *Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

9. Cartwright, N. (2007). *Causal Powers: What Are They? Why Do We Need Them? What Can be Done with Them and What Cannot?* Contingency and Dissent in Science Technical Report 04/07 (2007). London: Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, LSE.
10. Cartwright, N. (2000). *Measuring Causes: Invariance, Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition*. Measurement in Physics and Economics Discussion Paper Series Monograph DP MEAS 10/00 London: Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, LSE.
11. Cartwright, N. (1999). *The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Represented as a *Fathom Internet Story*. Also translated to Chinese; published by the Shanghai Scientific & Technological Education Publishing House.
12. Cartwright, N., Cat, J., Fleck, L., and Uebel, T.E. (1996). *Otto Neurath: Philosophy between Science and Politics Ideas in Context* Series No. 38. New York: Cambridge University Press. Reproduced as an eBook (2009).
13. Cartwright, N. (1994). *Nature's Capacities and their Measurement*. New York: Oxford University Press. Reproduced in *Oxford Scholarship on Line* (2003).
14. Cartwright, N. (1983). *How the Laws of Physics Lie*. New York: Oxford University Press. Reproduced in *Oxford Scholarship on Line* (2003). Also translated to Chinese; published by the Shanghai Scientific & Technological Education Publishing House.

EDITED BOOKS

1. Cartwright, N. and Ward, K. (Eds.) (2016). *Rethinking Order: After the Laws of Nature*. London: Bloomsbury.
2. Cartwright, N. and Montuschi, E. (Eds.) (2014). *Philosophy of Social Science. A New Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press. Also translated to Chinese; published by China Science Publishing and Media Ltd of Beijing.
3. Jones, M.R., and Cartwright, N. (Eds.) (2005). *Idealization XII: Correcting the Models. Idealization and Abstraction in the Sciences*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

ARTICLES AND CHAPTERS

1. Cartwright, N. (Forthcoming). The paper on social activist research for Johannesburg. In Badat, Saleem (Ed.)
2. Nancy Cartwright and Nick Cowen. 2025. Disagreement about Evidence-Based Policy in Baghrmian, M., Carter, J.A., and Cosker-Rowland, R. (Eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement*: 486-496. London: Routledge.
3. Cartwright, N., Foglesong, S., Furman, K., Hyde, BVE., Nyberg, G., Ortiz Villa, K. and Slanickova, H. (Forthcoming). *Towards a Theory of Objectivity for Activist Research*. Emerging Scholars Initiative Press at the University of Pretoria.
4. Cartwright, N. and Ray, F. (Forthcoming). *Modelling Objectively*. In R. Erdbeer, V. Hagenmeyer and K. Stierstorfer (Eds.), *The Modelling of Energy Transition. Cultures – Visions – Narratives*. London: Palgrave Macmillan 2023.
5. Cartwright, N. (Forthcoming). *Evidence, relevance and warrant: In defence of voluntarism*. In W. Essler, D. Follesdal and M. Frauchiger (Eds.), *Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy*. De Gruyter.
6. Cartwright, N. (2024). *Evidence, Relevance and Warrant: In Defence of Voluntarism*. In Beisbart, Claus and Frauchiger, M. (Eds.) *Scientific Theories and Philosophical Stances: Themes from van Fraassen*: 193-206. Boston: De Gruyter.
7. Cartwright, N., and Ray, F. (2023). *Objectivity and Intellectual Humility in Scientific Research: They're Harder Than You Think*. *European Review*, 31(4), 367-381. doi:10.1017/S1062798723000091
8. Joyce, K. & Cartwright, N. (2022) "How Should Evidence Inform Education Policy?" in Curren, R (Ed.) *Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Education*. Routledge.

9. Cartwright, N. (2022). How to Learn about Causes in the Single Case. In J. Widner, M. Woolcock, & D. Ortega Nieto (Eds.), *The Case for Case Studies: Methods and Applications in International Development*: 29-51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Cartwright, N. (2021). Rigour versus the need for evidential diversity. *Synthese* 199, 13095–13119.
11. Joyce, K. & Cartwright, N. (2020) Bridging the Gap Between Research and Practice: Predicting What Will Work Locally, *American Educational Research Journal* 57 (3).
12. Cartwright, N. (2020). Why Trust Science? Reliability, Particularity and the Tangle of Science. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*.
13. Cartwright, N., Charlton, L., Juden, M., Munslow, T. and Williams, R. B. (2020). Making predictions of programme success more reliable. CEDIL Methods Working Paper. Oxford: Centre of Excellence for Development Impact and Learning (CEDIL).
14. Cartwright, N., with Charlton, L., Juden, M., Munslow, T. and Williams, R. B. (2020). Using middle-level theory to improve programme and evaluation design. CEDIL Methods Brief. Oxford: CEDIL
15. Cartwright, N. and Pemberton, J. (2020). Causal processes – a social policy example. *Durham University: CHES Working Paper No. 2020-01*
16. Cartwright, N., Pemberton, J. and Wieten, S. (2020). Mechanisms, laws and explanation. *European Journal for Philosophy of Science*.
17. Cartwright, N. (2020). Mid-level theory: Without it what could anyone do? *Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science*, 35(3), 269-323.
18. Cowen, N. and Cartwright, N. (2019). Street-level Theories of Change: Adapting the Medical Model of Evidence-based Practice for Policing. In N. Fielding., K. Bullock and S. Holdaway (Eds.), *Evidence-Based Policing: Critical Reflections*. Abingdon: Routledge
19. Cartwright, N. (2019). What is meant by ‘rigour’ in evidence-based educational policy and what’s so good about it. Special issue of *Educational Research and Evaluation*.
20. Cartwright, N. (2019). Commentary: Why Mixed Methods Are Necessary for Evaluating Any Policy. In M. Nagatsu and A. Ruzzene, (Eds.), *Contemporary Philosophy and Social Science: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue*. (Bloomsbury).
21. Cartwright, N., Pemberton, J. and Wieten, S. (2018). Mechanisms, ceteris paribus laws and covering-law explanation. *Durham University: CHES Working Paper No. 2018-04 Also as Working Paper: Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, LSE, London, UK*.
22. Game, E., Tallis, H., Olander, L., Alexander, S., Busch, J., Cartwright, N., Kalies, E., Masuda, Y., Mupepele, A., Qiu, J., Rooney, A., Sills, E., Sutherland, W. (2018) Cross-disciplinary evidence principles for social-environmental. *Nature Sustainability*.
23. Deaton, A. and Cartwright, N. (2018). Understanding and misunderstanding randomized controlled trials. *Randomized Controlled Trials and Evidence-based Policy: A Multidisciplinary Dialogue. Social Science & Medicine Special Issue*. 210: 1-90.
24. Cartwright, N., Oliver, S., Gough, D., Stewart, R., Dickson, K., Bangpan, M., Pells, K., Hargreaves, J. and Roche, C. (2018) Stakeholder engagement for development impact and learning. *The Centre of Excellence for Development Impact and Learning (CEDIL) Inception Papers*.
25. Cartwright, N., Davey, C., Hargreaves, J., Hassan, S., Gough, D., Humphreys, M., Masset, E., Oliver, S., Prost, A. and Bonell, C. (2018) Designing evaluations to provide evidence to inform action in new settings. *The Centre of Excellence for Development Impact and Learning (CEDIL) Inception Papers*.
26. Cartwright, N. (2018). Will Your Policy Work? Experiments vs. Models. In I.F. Peschard and B.C. van Frassen (Eds.), *The Experimental Side of Modeling*. University of Minnesota Press.

27. Cartwright, N. (2018). What evidence should guidelines take note of? *Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice*, 24(5), 1139-1144.
28. Cartwright, N. and Merluzzi, P. (2018). Are Laws of Nature Consistent with Contingency? In W. Ott and L. Patto (Eds.), *Laws of Nature, an anthology*. Oxford University Press (UK). Also as *Durham University: CHESS Working Paper No. 2016-06*.
29. Cartwright, N. and Joyce, K. (2018). Meeting Our Standards for Educational Justice: Doing Our Best with the Evidence. *Theory and Research in Education*. 16(1) 3–22.
30. Cartwright, N. (2018). Theoretical Practices That Work: Those That Mimic Nature's Own. *Spontaneous Generations*, vol. 9.
31. Game, E., Tallis, H., Olander, L., Alexander, S., Busch, J., Cartwright, N., Kalies, E., Masuda, Y., Mupepele, A., Qiu, J., Rooney, A., Sills, E., & Sutherland, W. (2018). Cross-disciplinary evidence principles for social-environmental sustainability. *Nature Sustainability*, 1(9), 452-454.
32. Deaton, A. and Cartwright, N. (2017). Understanding and misunderstanding randomized controlled trials. *Social Science & Medicine*. 210: 2–21.
33. Rutter, M., Cartwright, N et al. (2017) Sources of evidence for assessing the safety, efficacy and effectiveness of medicines. *Academy of Medical Sciences working group report*.
34. Cartwright, N., Bradburn, N. and Fuller, J. (2017). A Theory of Measurement. In L. McClimans (Eds.), *Measurement in Medicine: Philosophical Essays on Assessment and Evaluation*. Also as *Durham University: CHESS Working Paper No. 2016-07*.
35. Cartwright, N. (2017). How to Learn about Causes in the Single Case. *Durham University: CHESS Working Paper No. 2017-04*.
36. Cartwright, N., Cowen, N., Virk, B. and Mascarenhas -Keyes, S. (2017). RCTs, systematic reviews and the limits of 'what works': evidence from public education in England. *Critical Review*. 29:3: 265-292.
37. Bateson, P., Cartwright, N., Dupré, J., Laland, K. and Noble, D. (2017). Introduction: New trends in evolutionary biology: biological, philosophical and social science perspectives. *Interface Focus*. 7(5): 1-3.
38. Cartwright, N. (2017). Can Structural Equations Explain How Mechanisms Explain? In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and H. Price (Eds.), *Making a Difference*. New York: Oxford University Press.
39. Cartwright, N. (2017). Causal Powers: Why Humeans Can't Even Be Instrumentalists. In J. Jacobs, (Eds.), *Causal Powers*. New York: Oxford University Press.
40. Cartwright, N. and Bhakthavatsalam, S. (2017). What's so special about empirical adequacy? *European Journal for Philosophy of Science*.
41. Cartwright, N. and Hardie, J. (2017). Predicting What Will Happen When You Intervene. *Clinical Social Work Journal*. 45:270–279.
42. Cartwright, N. (2017). Big Systems Versus Stocky Tangles: It Can Matter to the Details. *Erkenntnis*. 83:3–19.
43. Deaton, A. and Cartwright, N. (2016). Understanding and misunderstanding randomized controlled trials. *NBER Working Paper No. w22595* and *Durham University: CHESS Working Paper No. 2016-05*.
44. Cartwright, N. (2016). Single Case Causes: What is Evidence and Why. In H. Chao, S. Chen and J. Reiss (Eds.), *Philosophy of Science in Practice: Nancy Cartwright and the Nature of Scientific Reasoning*. Dordrecht: Springer. Also as *Durham University: CHESS Working Paper No. 2015-02*.
45. Deaton, A. and Cartwright, N. (2016). The limitations of randomised controlled trials. *VoxEU.org*

46. Deaton, A. and Cartwright, N. (2016). Understanding and misunderstanding randomized controlled trials. *NBER Working Paper No. w22595 and Durham University: CHES Working Paper No. 2016-05*.
47. Cartwright, N. (2016). Where is the Rigor When You Need It? In I. Marinovic (Ed.), *Foundations and Trends® in Accounting: Special Issue on Causal Inferences in Capital Markets Research*. 10(2-4): 106-124.
48. Cartwright, N. (2016). Loose Talk Kills: What's Worrying about Unity of Method. *Philosophy of Science* 2016. 83(5): 768-778.
49. Cartwright, N. (2016). Contingency and the Order of Nature. In G. Radick (Eds.), *Replaying Life's Tape*, a special issue of *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences*. 58: 56-63.
50. Cartwright, N. and Marcellesi, A. (2016). Deliberating Policy: Where morals and methods mix – and not always for the best. In J. Pfeifer and M. Couch (Eds.), *The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher*. New York: Oxford University Press. Also as *Durham University: CHES Working Paper No. 2014-02*.
51. Cartwright, N. (2016). The Natural and the Moral Order. What's to Blame? In W. Doniger, P. Galison and S. Neiman (Eds.), *What Reason Promises*. De Gruyter.
52. Cartwright, N. (2016). The Dethronement of Laws in Science. In N. Cartwright and K. Ward (Eds.), *Rethinking Order: After the Laws of Nature*. London: Bloomsbury.
53. Cartwright, N. and Davis, J.B. (2016). Economics as Science. In R. Skidelsky and N. Craig (Eds.), *Who Runs the Economy?* Palgrave Macmillan.
54. Cartwright, N. (2016). Scientific Models versus Social Reality. In a special issue of *Building Research & Information: International Research, Development, Demonstration and Innovation*. 44(3-4): 334-337.
55. Cartwright, N. (2015). The Dewey Lecture 2015: Philosophy of Social Technology: Get on Board. *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*.
56. Cartwright, N. (2015). How Could Laws Make Things Happen? In N. Spurway (Eds.), *Laws of Nature, Laws of God? Proceedings of the Science and Religion Forum Conference 2014*. Cambridge Scholars.
57. Cowen, N. and Cartwright, N. with Virk, B. and Mascarenhas-Keyes, S. (2015). Making the Most of the Evidence: Evidence-based policy in the classroom. Durham University: CHES Working Paper No. 2015-03.
58. Cartwright, N. and Marcellesi, A. (2015). EBP: Where Rigor Matters. In C. E. Crangle, A. Garcia de la Sienna, and H. E. Longino (Eds.), *Foundations and Methods from Mathematics to Neuroscience: Essays Inspired by Patrick Suppes*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (CSLI Publications).
59. Cowen, N. and Cartwright, N. (2014). *Making the Most of the Evidence in Education: A Guide for Working Out What Works...Here and Now*. Durham University: CHES Working Paper No. 2014-03.
60. Cartwright, N. and Pemberton, J. (2014). Ceteris paribus laws need machines to generate them. *Erkenntnis*, 79(10):1745-1758.
61. Cartwright, N. (2014). Measurement. In N. Cartwright, and E. Montuschi, (Eds.), *Philosophy of Social Science. A New Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
62. Cartwright, N. (2014). Causality. In N. Cartwright, and E. Montuschi, (Eds.), *Philosophy of Social Science. A New Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
63. Marcellesi, A. and Cartwright, N. (2013). Modeling mitigation and adaptation policies to predict their effectiveness: The limits of randomized controlled trials. In E. Winsberg, and E. Lloyd (Eds.), *Philosophical and Conceptual Issues in Climate Modeling*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Also published as Working Paper 120 by the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment (LSE).

64. Cartwright, N. (2013). Evidence, Argument and Prediction. In V. Karakostas, and D. Dieks (Eds.), *EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science, The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings 2*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing Switzerland.
65. Cartwright, N. (2013). God's Order, Man's Order and the Order of Nature. *Euresis*, 5:99-108.
66. Cartwright, N. (2013). Knowing What We Are Talking About: Why Evidence Doesn't Always Travel. *Evidence and Policy: a Journal of Research, Debate and Practice*, 9(1): 97-112.
67. Cartwright, N. and Pemberton, J. (2013). Aristotelian Powers: Without Them, What Would Modern Science Do? In J. Greco, and R. Gross (Eds.), *Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism*. New York: Routledge.
68. Cartwright, N. and Martin, E. (2012). Queen Physics: How Much of the World is Painted Red. In F. Watts, and C. Knight (Eds.), *God and the Scientist*. Surrey: Ashgate.
69. Cartwright, N. (2012). RCT's, Evidence and Predicting Policy Effectiveness. In H. Kincaid (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the Social Sciences*. New York: Oxford University Press.
70. Cartwright, N. and Rol, M. (2012). Warranting the Use of Causal Claims: A Non-Trivial Case for Interdisciplinarity. *Theoria*, 27:189-202.
71. Cartwright, N. (2012). A Question of Nonsense. *Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly*, 63:102-116.
72. Cartwright, N. (2012). Will This Policy Work for You? Predicting Effectiveness Better: How Philosophy Helps. *Philosophy of Science*, 79(5):973-989.
73. Cartwright, N. and Bradburn, N. (2011). A Theory of Measurement. *The Importance of Common Metrics for Advancing Social Science Theory and Research: Proceedings of the National Research Council Committee on Common Metrics*.
74. Cartwright, N. (2011). Predicting What Will Happen When We Act: What Counts for Warrant? *Preventive Medicine*, 53:221-224.
75. Cartwright, N., Contessa, G. and Steed, S. (2011). Keeping Track of Neurath's Bill: Abstract Concepts, Stock Models and the Unity of Classical Physics. In O. Pombo, J. Symons and J. M. Torres (Eds.), *Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science*. Stuttgart: Springer.
76. Cartwright, N. and Efstathiou, S. (2011). Hunting Causes and Using Them: Is There No Bridge from Here to There? *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 25(3):223-241. Also as Contingency and Dissent in *Science Technical Report 05/09*, CPNSS, LSE.
77. Cartwright, N. and Bradburn, N. (2011). A Theory of Measurement. *The Importance of Common Metrics for Advancing Social Science Theory and Research: Proceedings of the National Research Council Committee on Common Metrics*.
78. Cartwright, N. (2011). Evidence, External Validity and Explanatory Relevance. In G. Morgan (Eds.), *Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein*. New York: Oxford University Press.
79. Cartwright, N. (2011). A Philosophers View of the Long Road from RCTs to Effectiveness. *The Lancet*, 377:1400-1401.
80. Cartwright, N. (2011). Predicting "It Will Work for Us": (Way) beyond statistics. In P. M. Illari, F. Russo, and J. Williamson (Eds.), *Causality in the Sciences*. New York: Oxford University Press.
81. Cartwright, N. and Stegenga, J. (2011). A Theory of Evidence for Evidence-Based Policy. In P. Dawid, W. Twining., and M. Vasilaki (Eds.), *Evidence, Inference and Enquiry (Proceedings of the British Academy)*. New York: Oxford University Press.
82. Cartwright, N. (2010). Foreword. In J. Woods (Eds.), *Fictions and Models: New Essays*. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
83. Cartwright, N. (2010). Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics and Replies to Longworth and Weber. *Analysis* 70(2):307-310.

84. Cartwright, N. (2010). Models: Parables v Fables. In R. Frigg, and M. Hunter (Eds.), *Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science*. New York: Springer. Also in (2009). *Insights*, 1(11):2-10.
85. Bovens, L. and Cartwright, N. (2010). Measuring the Impact of Philosophy. *Science and Technology Parliamentary Committee Papers – Research Funding Cuts*. Available at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/memo/spendingcuts/uc8302.htm>
86. Cartwright, N. and Munro, E. (2010). The Limitations of RCTs in Predicting Effectiveness. *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, 16(2):260-66.
87. Cartwright, N. (2010). What are Randomised Controlled Trials Good For. *Philosophical Studies*, 147(1):59-70.
88. Cartwright, N. (2010). Reply to Steel and Pearl: Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics. *Economics and Philosophy*, 26(1):87-94.
89. Cartwright, N. and Fennell, D. (2010). Does Roush Show Evidence Should Be Probable? *Synthese*, 175(3):289-310.
90. Cartwright, N. (2010) Relativism in the Philosophy of Science. In M. Krausz (Eds.), *Relativism: A Contemporary Anthology*. New York: Columbia University Press.
91. Cartwright, N. (2010). Natural Laws and the Closure of Physics. In R. Y. Chiao, W. D. Phillips, A. J. Leggett, M. L. Cohen, and C. L. Harper (Eds.), *Visions of Discovery. New Light on Physics, Cosmology and Consciousness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
92. Cartwright, N., Goldfinch, A. and Howick, J. (2009). Evidence-Based Policy: Where Is Our Theory of Evidence? *Journal of Children's Services*, 4(4):6-14. Also (2007). In A. Beckermann, H. Tetens, and S. Walter (Eds.), *Philosophy: Foundations and Applications, Main Lectures and Colloquia Talks of the German Analytic Philosophy Conference GAP*. Also in (2007) *Technical Report 02/07, Contingency and Dissent in Science Series*. CPNSS, LSE.
93. Cartwright, N. (2009). How To Do Things with Causes, Presidential Address. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 83(2):5-22.
94. Cartwright, N. (2009). Measuring Research Impact: Special Problems. *Report for the Research Excellence Framework Consultation*. London: Consortium of Institutes of Advanced Study.
95. Cartwright, N. (2009). What Is This Thing Called Efficacy? In C. Mantzavinos (Eds.), *Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
96. Cartwright, N. (2009). Evidence-Based Policy: What's to be Done About Relevance? *Philosophical Studies*, 143(1):127-136.
97. Cartwright, N. (2009). Causality, Invariance and Policy. In H. Kincaid, and D. Ross (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
98. Cartwright, N. (2009). Why be Hanged for Even a Lamb? In B. Monton (Eds.), *Images of Empiricism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
99. Cartwright, N. (2009). Causal Laws, Policy Predictions, and the Need for Genuine Powers. In T. Handfield, (Eds.), *Dispositions and Causes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
100. Cartwright, N. (2008). If No Capacities then No Credible Worlds. But Can Models Reveal Capacities? *Erkenntnis*, 70(1):45-48.
101. Cartwright, N. (2008). In Praise of the Representation Theorem. In M. Frauchiger, and W. K. Essler (Eds.), *Representation, Evidence, and Justification: Themes from Suppes*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
102. Cartwright, N. (2008). Replies. In S. Hartmann, C. Hofer, and L. Bovens (Eds.), *Nancy Cartwright's Philosophy of Science [throughout]*. New York: Routledge.

103. Cartwright, N. and Chang, H. (2008). Measurement. In S. Psillos, and M. Curd (Eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science*. New York: Routledge.
104. Cartwright, N. and Frigg, R. (2007). String theory under scrutiny. *Physics World*, September 2007:14-15.
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- Management Committee, BIOS, London School of Economics

- Standing Committee on Standards of Evidence and the Quality of Behavioural and Social Science Research, U.S. National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences
- Vice-President, British Association for the Advancement of Science
- Chair, Program Committee for Philosophy of Science and Epistemology, Fourth European Congress for Analytical Philosophy
- Chair, Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics
- President, History of Science Section, British Association for the Advancement of Science
- Advisory Board, Cities, Architecture & Engineering Programme, London School of Economics
- Management Committee of the Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics
- Scientific Board, Society for the Advancement of the Scientific World Conception, Institute Vienna Circle
- Advisory Board of the Alternative Natural Philosophy Association
- Ad Hoc Appointments Committee, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
- Steering Committee for Summer School on Theory of Knowledge, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Warsaw
- Science and Technology Studies Advisory Panel for James S McDonnell Centennial Fellows Program
- Advisory Board, Center for History of Recent Science, Washington, D.C.
- Advisory Board, Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine, Imperial College, London
- Advisory Board, Centre for Interdisciplinary Research (ZIF), Bielefeld, Germany
- Mind Executive Committee
- Convenor, Department of Philosophy Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics
- Lakatos Award Committee, London School of Economics
- Advisory Board, Institute for Advanced Study, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin
- Executive Committee, The Joint Centre for History and Economics, University of Cambridge and Harvard University
- Chair, Philosophy Department, Stanford University
- National Science Foundation Oversight Committee for History and Philosophy of Science
- U.S. National Committee, International Union of History and Philosophy of Science
- Committee for the History of Science, Stanford University
- President, American Association of University Professors, Stanford Chapter
- National Science Foundation Award Panel, History & Philosophy of Science

- President, Society for Exact Philosophy

EDITORIAL BOARDS

- Philosophy of Science (1994–2002) and (2009-2011) and (2018-2019) and (2021-2022) and (2023-2024)
- Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice (-present)
- Journal of Economic Methodology (1996-1999) and (2002-2008) and (2010-2016) and (2016-)
- Topics in Contemporary Philosophy (with MIT Press)
- Revue de Philosophie Economique
- AFOS
- Economics and Philosophy
- Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics (EJPE)
- Erkenntnis
- European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2009–)
- Foundations of Science
- Foundations of Physics Letters
- Handbook on the Ethics of Science
- INPC
- International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
- Journal of The Society of Humanist Philosophers
- Metatheoria – Revista de Filosofia e Historia de la Cincencia (2009-
- Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
- Philosophical Perspectives
- Revue de Philosophie Economique
- Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics
- Synthèse
- Theoria
- Women's Philosophy Review
- Handbook of Philosophy of Social Sciences, SAGE publications

GRANTS

- 'Providing Credible Evidence For Singular Causal Claims', AHRC (with Eileen Munro)
- 'The Successes and Failures Of Science Through The Lens Of Intellectual Humility: Perspectives From The History And Philosophy Of Science', John Templeton Foundation (with Robin Hendry)
- 'Objectivity between social science and social practice: Ruth First in Durham', BA/Leverhulme Small Research Grants Awards
- 'Use of 'middle-level' theory for planning and prediction', UK Department for International Development (for its Centre of Excellence for Development, Impact and Learning)
- 'Structure', Institute of Advanced Study, Durham University
- 'New Methods for Moulding Models to Specific Cases to Enhance Policy Predictions', US National Science Foundation
- 'Meeting our Standards for Educational Justice: Making the Most of the Evidence', The Center for Ethics and Education, University of Wisconsin
- 'Knowledge for Use', European Research Council Advanced Grant
- 'Evidence', Institute of Advanced Study, Durham University
- 'Impact', Durham Seedcorn Award
- 'Choices of Evidence: Tacit Philosophical Assumptions in the Debates within the Campbell Collaboration', AHRC (with Eileen Munro and Eleonora Montuschi)
- 'A Theory of Evidence for Use', British Academy Research Development Award
- 'God's Order, Man's Order and the Order of Nature', John Templeton Foundation (with Eric Watkins)
- 'Evidence for Use: Prolegomena to a Theory of Evidence-Based Education Policy', Spencer Foundation
- 'Evidence for Use', LSE Seed Fund
- 'Contingency and Dissent in Science', AHRC
- 'Methods for Causal Inference: Status and Health', British Academy
- 'Biomedical Research: Towards a Well-Ordered Science', Columbia-LSE Alliance Collaborative Research Fund
- 'Causality', Latsis Foundation
- 'Causal Pluralism and Causal Inference, with Applications to Health and Status', U.S. National Science Foundation
- 'A Defence of Scientific Theories as Tools', with Mauricio Suarez, New Del Amo Programme, UCSD/Universidad Complutense, Madrid
- 'Causality: Metaphysics and Methods', AHRC

- 'Measurement in Physics and Economics', Latsis Foundation
- 'Causality in Economics', Latsis Foundation
- 'Philosophy and Economics', A. K. Knight
- 'The Political Economy of the German Historical School', History and Economics Centre, Cambridge University, Leverhulme
- 'Modelling in Physics and Economics', Latsis Foundation
- 'Causes and Capacities', U.S. National Science Foundation
- 'Philosophical Analysis of Quantum Mechanics', U.S. National Science Foundation

MEMBERSHIPS

- Philosophy of Science Association
- American Philosophical Association
- MIND Association
- American Association of University Professors
- Association of University Teachers (Britain)
- British Society for the Philosophy of Science

MEDIA EVENTS AND PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS

- HowTheLightGetsIn 2020, Hay-on-Wye:
Debate: Beyond Material
- HowTheLightGetsIn 2019, Hay-on-Wye:
Talk: Science: why trust it?
Debate (and podcast): The End of All Things (with John Dupré and Subir Sarkar)
Debate: Sense and Nonsense
- HowTheLightGetsIn Festival 2018, Hay-on-Wye:
Debate: The Edge of Reality
- Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection (PHAP), Learning Stream on Humanitarian Coordination: NGOs in government-led and refugee coordination contexts (via Webinar)
- BBC Radio 4, Whodunnit? 'The Pregnant Teen Vanishes: Conspiracy to Commit' discussing social policy in relation to the decline in teen pregnancy figures in the UK
- HowTheLightGetsIn Festival 2016, Hay-on-Wye:
The Elegant Truth (discussion panel)
Explaining the Inexplicable (discussion panel)
Language and the World (discussion panel)
IAI Academy: Evidence and Ideology
- HowTheLightGetsIn Festival 2015, Hay-on-Wye:
Seeing Things Whole (discussion panel)
The Comedy of Errors (discussion panel)
Unnatural Laws and Unexplained Events (discussion panel)

- HowTheLightGetsIn Festival 2014, Hay-on-Wye:
Ultimate Proof (open platform)
The Elegant Universe (open platform)
Tea, Cake and Philosophy: Should we see independent evidence as an illusion? (discussion panel)
- BBC Radio 4 with Ben Goldacre, discussing her new book (written with Jeremy Hardie) *Evidence Based Policy: A Practical Guide to Doing it Better*
- Linus Pauling Memorial Lecture, Institute for Science, Engineering and Public Policy, 'From Science to Policy. What's so Good about Evidence?'
- BBC Radio 4, *In Our Time*, 'Logical Positivism'
- Filosofisk Supplement, 'Philosophy of Dappled Things - A Conversation with Nancy Cartwright' by Gry Oftedal
- BBC Radio 4, Science Friction series, 'The Trouble with Physics'
- RSA, Symposium 'The Trouble with Physics - The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science and What Comes Next', Lecture 'Physics in Conflict'
- BBC Radio 4, *In Our Time*, 'Karl Popper'
- *Sciences et Avenir*, Interview, 'Les lois de la physique sont fictives'
- 'Professor Nancy Cartwright', House of Commons: Science and Technology Committee, *Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making: Seventh Report, Session 2005-2006*, Vol 2, p. EV 96, November 2006
- 'The Place of Philosophy and History of Science in the Science Curriculum', House of Commons: Science and Technology Committee, *Science Education from 14 to 19: Third Report of Session 2001-02*, appendix 44, pp. 190 –191, February 2002
- BBC Radio 4, *Start the Week*, 'The Myth of Universalism in Science and Politics'
- BBC Radio 4, *In Our Time*, "'Ubiquity" The Science of History...or Why the World is Simpler than we Think'
- BBC Radio 4 series, 'A Brief History of the End of Everything'
- *Prospect* – Roundtable Discussions, 5th Anniversary Issue, 56 - 'The Meaning of Genome'
- BBC Radio 4, *Analysis*, 'Wrong, Scary or the Greatest Thing?'
- BBC/Open University programme, 'The Mother of all Collisions'
- Interview by Jonathan Walmsley in the *Philosophers' Magazine*, Autumn 1998, pp. 36–38.
- BBC Radio 4, *Analysis*, '2+2=5'
- BBC Radio 3, *Living Ideas*, on Otto Neurath
- American TV series, *In Search of Wisdom*, Interview
- 'The Cartwright Discussion' in *In Conversation: Donald Davidson*, video and monograph by Philosophy International

- BBC2 Television, *Brains Trust*
- *Cogito*, 'An Interview with Nancy Cartwright'

INVITED LECTURES AND CONFERENCES

PSA Conference, New Orleans, USA. 17 November 2024. *Objectivity in Science* -symposium.

Inaugural Mary Hesse Lecture, University of Cambridge, UK. 24 October 2024. *In praise of the inexact, the inelegant and the unassuming.*

University of Liverpool, England. Speaker at Departmental Research Seminar. 3 October 2024. *Reliability trumps truth.*

Condorcet lecture, Paris, France. 26 September 2024. *Is economics queen of the social sciences?*

Sustainable Cooperation (SCOOP) conference, Utrecht University: Better Evidence for Policy Predictions & Evaluations

Department for Work and Pensions seminar, London: Methods for Causal Inference

Health and the Environment: concepts, methods, and policy, Institute for Advanced Study (IAS), University of Amsterdam: Telling a thicker causal story: pToCs and the systems that support them

Cartwright and Anscombe on Causation workshop, Durham University, Introduction 'in favour of casual causation' and closing remarks

Set Theory, Constructivism, and Science: A Symposium on James Mahoney's *The Logic of Social Science*, Central European University

MINANS symposium on scientific method, University of Kent: Tendency principles, what they are and what you can do with them

Hayek Workshop: London School of Economics: Models (panel alongside Tim Besley and Florian Artinger)

RCEA Panel on Predictability in Science and Society (webinar): Singular causation and its evidence: Warranting causal predictions in the single case. Alongside David F. Hendry (Oxford University) and Carlo Rovelli,

The Ruth Barcan Marcus Memorial Lecture 2022, Yale University: *The Tangle of Science: Reliability beyond the Scientific Method, Rigor, and Objectivity*

27th Graz Schumpeter Lectures, Graz Schumpeter Centre, University of Graz: *Is economics the queen of the social sciences? The bad news—and the good*

1. The vanity of rigour
2. Economics: the inexact science
3. Objectivity – to be found
4. The queen vs the Motley assembly

33rd Annual Conference of Academia Europaea (AE), Building Bridges 2022, Barcelona: *Modelling Objectively*

Learning from case studies – developing more robust strategies for generalization workshop, Tilburg University: *Causal-process-tracing theories of change: tools for moving from case to case*

Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics (EIPE)'s 25th anniversary workshop, University of Rotterdam: *Rigour: Siren or Saviour?*

Science beyond the Horizon Seminar Series, University of Amsterdam: *Science in the Earthly Plane*

Life in the Universe Initiative Seminar, University of Cambridge: Nature, the Artful Modeller (versus Nature the Fastidious Bureaucrat)

Idealization and Modeling Workshop, Angelicum Thomistic Institute, Rome: Modeling with (not very) Aristotelian Powers (co-authored with John Pemberton)

New Mechanism, Reduction and Emergence in Physics, Chemistry and Biology International Conference, University of Lisbon: "Mechanistic v covering-law explanation: a false conflict (co-authored with John Pemberton)

International LMET Conference, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster: Objective Modelling

Naturalism and the Stanford School Workshop: Open discussion about how to understanding the concept of naturalism within the disunity of science movement known as the Stanford School (or 'Stanford Disunity Mafia')

Moral Sciences Club Seminar, University of Cambridge: Causal models, causal principles and evidence for singular causation

Breaking Down the Barriers: Applied Conceptual Engineering (ACE) Conference, Arché, The University of St Andrews: Philosophy in the earthly plane

Quantitative Methods Network (QMNET) Seminar, University of Melbourne: Predicting what will happen when you act: Via a causal-process-tracing Theory of Change

Making Responsible Decisions in and about Science Workshop, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Center: Responsible Science: Responsible Use

Reconsidering Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science Workshop, University of Bristol: Philosophy in the Earthly Plane

Durham University Webinar Series, online event: Creating knowledge across disciplinary boundaries (with Prof [Tom McLeish](#) and in partnership with the Chinese Academy of Sciences

The Centre of Excellence for Development Impact and Learning (CEDIL) Workshop on 'The use of mid-range theory in CEDIL funded studies', online event: Making predictions of programme success more reliable

Departmental Research Seminar, Department of Philosophy, Durham University: What's in a tangle? How does it promote reliability?

2020 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, London: Why Trust Science?

Biomedical Ethics Seminar Series, Institute for Practical Ethics, UCSD: Where morals & methods mix -- & not always for the best

St Andrews Philosophy Society Lecture, The University of St Andrews: Why Big Theory Is Here to Stay

Inaugural Centre for Philosophy and the Sciences (CPS) Annual Lecture, University of Oslo: Evidence and the Demands of Rigor

50th Anniversary Conference, Bielefeld University: Keynote Speaker - Why Big Theories are here to Stay

The Thalheimer Lectures 2019, Johns Hopkins University: Why Trust Science

1. The usual suspects: rigor, method, objectivity
2. Nest-building: how the tangle of practice makes for good science
3. Penicillin, boiling, and the democratic peace

Reviving Instrumentalism in Philosophy of Science Conference, Durham University: Nature the Artful Modeler

British Society of Criminology Conference 2019, University of Lincoln: Street-level Theories of Change: Adapting the Medical Model of Evidence-based Practice for Policing (joint paper with Nick Cowen – presented by Cowen)

MATTER, IDEAS, NATURE: A Conference in Memory of David Marcus Knight, Durham University: Trust in Science

CRASSH: The Politics of Economics Seminar, University of Cambridge: Evidence for Policy Prediction: Intervention-centred or Context-centred? (with Eleonora Montuschi: Using science, making policy: what should we worry about?)

CEDIL-CfE Lecture, LHSTM, London: Evidence For Action In New Settings: The Importance Of Middle-Level Theory

The Big Evidence Debate, CEM, Durham University: Panel discussion 'Is meta-analysis the best we can do? A critical discussion of the best approaches to synthesising research findings' (with Professor Steve Higgins, Professor Catherine Hewitt and Ben Styles)

SKAPE Keynote Lecture, University of Edinburgh: The Intervention-centred vs the Context-centred Approach to EBP

UCL's Philosophy Society, London: Scientific laws and predictive models: Building Birds Nests from a Handful of Sticks

Jowett Society Lecture Series, University of Oxford: Nature the Artful Modeler

Royal Society and British Academy Workshop on Narratives and Science, London: Panel chair 'Everyone's a Scientist'

Science and its Limits: Contemporary and Kantian Perspectives, TU Dortmund, Germany: In Defense of Physics as an Instrument

2017 Lebowitz Prize Session, 2019 APA Central Division meeting: Elliott Sober, The Scientific Method - Methods that aren't Subject-Specific and Nancy Cartwright, The Scientific Method - The Devil is always in the Details

Philosophy Department Lecture, California State University Northridge: Middle-level theory: Without it what could anyone do?

PISE Lecture, Ca' Foscari University of Venice: Towards a Philosophy of Social Technology

Lullius Lectures, IX Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science:

1. Markers, mechanisms and measures
2. Causal-chain models and theories of change
3. Mechanisms and mid-level laws

The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Seattle, Washington: No-No to Singular Causation: Healthy Scepticism?

Transforming the field: Use of Research Evidence in Policy and Practice, Nuffield Foundation: Predicting policy success: Where does the buck stop?

8th International Lauener Symposium on Analytical Philosophy on Themes from Bas van Fraassen, Switzerland: The Argument Theory of Evidence: A Foundation for Voluntarism

MMIRA International Conference 2018, University of Vienna: First mix the claims; then mix the methods

2018 ESRC Research Methods Festival, University of Bath: 'Causal inference: Evidence for the single case?'

Department for Social Policy and Intervention Seminar Series, University of Oxford: Evidence for Policy Prediction: Intervention-centred or Context-centred?

Distinguished Philosophers Public Lecture Series, University of Lincoln: Evidence-based Policy: Where Philosophy Meets Practice

6th Annual Conference and General Meeting of the Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP) Ireland, University College Dublin: What's with scientific method? What's with rigour?

The Human Welfare Conference 2018, Green Templeton College, University of Oxford: Roundtable – Exploring Validity: Questioning the idea of evidence

Goldsmith's Lecture Series, University of London: RCTs: Where's the rigor when you need it?

The Wesley C. Salmon Memorial Lecture, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh: Causal Processes & Causal Interactions: Warranting Causation in the Single Case

Philosophy Department/BAPS Colloquium, University of California, Davis: A discussion between Nancy Cartwright and Bas van Fraassen 'Is the cat really lapping up the milk?'

Philosophy Department Colloquium, University of Wisconsin-Madison: Nancy Cartwright 'What do educators need to know?'

Philosophy Department Colloquium, University of California, Riverside: Scientific method: the devil is always in the details

Philosophy of Physics Research Seminar, Radcliffe Humanities, Oxford University: What are pragmatic trials in medicine good for?

Mental Health and Justice project seminar on Evidence and Objectivity, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King's College London

St Mary's College Society Lecture, Durham University: Evidence and Policy: Why 'What Works' Doesn't Work

The Guidelines Challenge: Philosophy, Practice, Policy, Oxford: What evidence should Guidelines take note of?

Inaugural Conference Centre for PPE, University of Groningen: PPE: Towards a philosophy of social technology

DFID's Centre of Excellence for Development, Impact and Learning pre-inception meeting, London: Two approaches to EBP

Impacts of International Agricultural Research: Rigorous Evidence for Policy Conference, organised by the CGIAR Independent Science and Partnership Council, and PIM research program led by IFPRI, Nairobi: What kinds of evidence for evidence-based policy?

Evidence, Uncertainty and Decision Making with a Particular Emphasis on Climate Science Workshop, Universität Salzburg: What's wrong with pragmatic trials?

Inferring Policy from Experiments Conference, University of Kent: Two Approaches to EBHP: Intervention-centring, Context-centring

2017 Carus Lectures (APA 2017 Pacific Division Meeting), Seattle: Nature, the Artful Modeler: Lectures on Laws, Science, How Nature Arranges the World and How We Can Arrange It Better

1. Her raw materials: powers, 'mechanisms', and causes. She manages actual possibilities, obeys the Barcan formula, and does not sit down with counterfactuals.
2. Her methods: our methods ... That's why ours work so well. But she is not a Kant, a Mussoloini, nor a Hilbert. Perhaps Isambard Brunel, Margaret Knight, or Mary Berry.
3. Her limits: Picking up where Nature leaves off, building it better, and warranting your work.

3ieLIDC Seminar Series, London: Intervention-centring, Context-centring: Two approaches, two sets of method gaps

SPoT Workshop, Powers and Change, Oxford: Powers, Contributions and What Really Happens

AAAS Annual Meeting 2017, Boston: Knowledge for Use: Making the Most of Social Science for Better Policies

Philosophy and Medicine Colloquium, King's College London: What's wrong with pragmatic trials?

Philosophy Department Seminar, University of Leeds: Nature the artful modeller: Truth, Know-how & the laws of Nature

Financial Conduct Authority, London: Getting to what works with evidence-based policy

London Systematic Reviews and Research Use Seminars, EPPI-Centre, London: What Works for Whom, Where?

Durham University Philosophy Society, Durham University: Truth, laws and models

Medical Evidence Symposium, PSA 2016, Atlanta: Pragmatic trials: What can we learn from them

Conference on Evidence-based policy, Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm: Understanding & Misunderstanding Randomized Controlled Trials

Science Studies Colloquium Series, University of Oslo: The Dethronement of Laws in Science

Symposium, The University of Bath Institute for Policy Research: Predicting Policy Outcomes: What Can the Evidence Do for You?

Evidence Grading Workshop, The Nature Conservancy, Iceland

2016 Brocher Summer Academy in Population-level Bioethics: Ethical design of randomized studies in development economics and health systems research in resource-poor settings, Brocher Foundation: Mixing morals and methods: can we be objective?

Gramlich Lecture, Dartmouth University: The Natural and the Moral Order: What's to Blame?

Special Memorial Session for Patrick Suppes and Jaako Hintikka, APA 2016 Pacific Division Meeting, San Francisco

Walton Lecture Series, Fordham University: Building better policies: making most of what the sciences teach

The Royal Society of Edinburgh/Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Joint Lecture, The Royal Society of Edinburgh: Scientific generalisations: What's so good about missing out all the differences?

Sir Malcolm Knox Memorial Lecture, University of St Andrew's: Will this policy work for us? Understanding and misunderstanding randomised controlled trials

Evidence on Trial – Public Lecture Series, Institute of Advanced Study, University of Durham: Evidence-based Policy: Where's the rigor when you need it?

Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture, University of York: How do we know who killed Roger Ackroyd?
Evidence for causation in the single case

Emergence Project Workshop: Downwards causation in the biological and social sciences, Durham: If
no downwards causation, then no causation at all (discussion chaired by Adam White)

Hempel and Beyond Conference, University of Cologne: Keynote speaker - Causation in the material
mode... or why empiricists can believe in causes

Gap.9 Conference, Osnabruck: Frege-prize colloquium in honour of Wolfgang Spohn – participant

Dispositions and Manifestations Conference, University of Cologne: How Do Dispositions Do What
They Do?

The Making of Measurement Conference, Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and
Humanities, University of Cambridge: Keynote speaker – The Theory of Measurement

Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Conference, Edinburgh: The Philosophy of Social Technology:
Making the Most of Social Science to Build Better Policies

The Jowett Society, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University: How do you know what made the
Ratman better?

Dewey Lecturer, APA Pacific Division Meeting 2015, Canada: The philosophy of social technology:
Get on board

The Centre for Global Studies Symposium: Power and Economics, London: Economics as Science

The Conference of Objectivity, National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan: Causation and objectivity:
Where's the rigor when you need it? [via Skype]

Causality in Social Sciences Conference, Stanford Graduate School of Business: What can social
scientists know?

Philosophy of Science Association Meeting, Chicago: Loose talk kills: What's worrying about unity of
method

Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Debates Series 2014-2015, University of Edinburgh: Predicting
what will happen when we intervene *and* Will this policy work for you: A philosophical analysis

Non-Alethic Aims of Enquiry Workshop, St Andrews University: Why not aim for truth in theory?

Spaces of Evidence Seminar, Goldsmiths: Reflections on the day

Ethical Legal and Social Aspects (ELSA) Conference, Norwegian University of Science and
Technology: A plea for the philosophy of social science technology – where ELSA matters

Vitenskapeteoretisk Forum Public Lecture, Norwegian University of Science and Technology:
Deliberating Policy: Where morals and methods mix – and not always for the best

The Grimen Memorial Lecture 2014, University of Oslo: Deliberating Policy: Where morals and
methods mix – and not always for the best

Science Studies Colloquium Series, University of Oslo: Making the Most of the Evidence

Annual Gowland Lecture, Science and Religion Forum 2014, Leeds Trinity University: Keynote
speaker – How could laws make things happen?

Department of History and Philosophy of Science Seminar, University of Cambridge: There are Mechanisms – and Then There are Mechanisms

Colloquium in honour of Rosemarie Rheinwald, University of Münster: Singular Causation

The Trial on Trial: Evidence in Interdisciplinary Contexts, University of Essex: Origins of the 'Randomista' Paradigm and Implications for Policymaking

Cambridge International Studies Association (CISA), University of Cambridge: Evidence-Based Policy: Doing it better

Psychological Therapies in the NHS: Re-thinking Psychological Therapies in the new NHS, Mermaid Conference Centre, London

Columbia University Epidemiology Scientific Symposium: Philosophy and Medicine: Explanation & Prediction in the Social Sciences, Columbia University, New York: Case Studies: Can they be as good as gold?

12th Justus Hartnack lecture, Aarhus University, Denmark: Evidence is Argument – Indeed, Deductive Argument

How Naturalistic are the Biomedical Sciences? Theoretical and Ethical Perspectives Conference, Institut für Ethik, Geschichte & Theorie der Medizin, Universität Münster: Deliberating Policy: Where morals and methods mix – and not always for the best

The Stanford School of Philosophy of Science Conference, Stanford University: Stanford School Core Members – panel participant

Realism and Antirealism in Philosophy Conference, Ca' Foscari University, Venice: Philosophy of Science – panel chair

European Network for the Philosophy of Social Sciences, University of Venice Ca' Foscari: Keynote speaker – Testing What You Think You are Testing

Contingency and Order in History and the Sciences Workshop, University of Oxford: Contingency and the Order of Nature

Brocher Symposium: Evidence in Healthcare Reform, Foundation Brocher, Geneva: What's Missing From 'What Works'?

Unconceived Alternatives and Scientific Realism Conference, Durham University: What's So Good about Empirical Adequacy?, with Sindhuja Bhakthavatsalam

Plenary Lecture, History and Philosophy of Evidence Based Medicine, University of Oxford: Evidence-based Policy: Doing it better

The Legacy of Erhard Scheibe, University of Dortmund: Coherence, generality and scope

INEM Conference 2013, Erasmus University Rotterdam: The Future of Philosophy of Economics – panel participant

The Tavistock Centre, London: Case Studies: Can They Be as Good as Gold?

Power Structuralism Seminar, University of Oxford: There are Mechanisms – and Then There are Mechanisms

Royal Institute of Philosophy seminars, University of Nottingham: There are Mechanisms – and Then There are Mechanisms

Frumkes lecture, New York University, Evidence-based Policy: Where Morals and Methods Mix – and not always for the Best

Irving Thalberg Jr Memorial Lecture, University of Illinois, Chicago: Moving On in Evidence-Based Policy: Experiments versus the modeling of society

Science Conversations conference, University of Dallas: Systems, Mechanisms and the Modeling of Society

American Economics Association Conference, San Diego: 'A Tale of Two Methods - Confronting Empirical Economics': Designing Experiments for Better External Validity – panel participant

Home Office, Westminster, London: Putting RCT's to Use

Departmental Research Seminar Series, London School of Economics: Evidence Based Policy: From efficacy to effectiveness

Structure at 50: Assessing and Reassessing Kuhn and his Legacy, Princeton University: Theory Change: So What is This Thing Called Theory?

Evidence, Capacities and Explanation Conference, National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan: Evidence Where Rigor Matters

Evidence and Causality in the Sciences Conference, University of Kent: If You Aren't Doing Arguments, You Aren't Doing Evidence

The 2012 Pufendorf Lecture Series, Lund University, Sweden: How to Know What will Happen When We Act: Using Evidence and the Right Kinds of Causal Knowledge, A Theory of Evidence for Use, Of What Use are Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs)?, The Power of Causal Powers, Nomo Logical Machines: Putting Causal Powers to Use

Southern Methodist University, Dallas TX: Predicting If This Policy Will Work for You (part of the ceremonies when being awarded an Honorary Degree, Doctor of Humane Letters, honors causa)

Intercept Meeting, Milan: Randomised Controlled Trials: Still the Gold Standard for Evidence-Based Medicine?

Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) Annual Conference, Berlin: What Can Economists Know? Rethinking the Foundations of Economic Understanding

Center for Values in Medicine, Science and Technology, UT Dallas: Wiser Use of Science, Wiser Wishes, Wiser Policies

The Rotman Institute Lectures, University of Western Ontario, Canada: Evidence, Argument and Mixed Methods and Wiser Use of Social Science, Wiser Wishes, Wiser Policies

Psychological Therapies in the NHS conference, London UK: Talking Therapies: What counts as credible evidence? – panel participant

Roundtable discussion about research methodologies used by NICE to assess talking therapies, Academy of Medical Sciences – panel participant

Public Lecture, London School of Economics: Predicting If Your Policy Will Work for You: Doing it Better

Springer Lecture in the Philosophy of Science, 3rd Biennial Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA), Athens, Greece: Evidence, Arguments and Mixed Methods

Causality and Explanation in the Sciences, Ghent University: Keynote speaker – Evidence-Based Policy: Mixing Methods Makes Good Practice, with Menno Rol

Expert Symposium, Putting Evidence into Practice: Challenges and Opportunities, University of Bedfordshire: The Journey from 'It Works There' to 'It Will Work Here': An Exploration of Practical and Philosophical Considerations in Developing and Applying Evidence Based Approaches, with Eileen Munro

Theoria Lecture, Swedish Filosofidagarna, Gottenburg, Sweden: Laws, Powers and Predictions

Business and Society Interdisciplinary Research Group, Cambridge University: Knowing What We are Talking About: Why Evidence Doesn't Always Travel, for Evidence-Based Policy-Making and the Real World: A Difficult Match?

3ie Seminar, International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, London: Thinking Out of the Black Box: 'What Philosophers Think of Impact Evaluation'

Putting Powers to Work, University of St Louis: Causal Powers: Why Humeans Can't Even Be Instrumentalists

APA Pacific Division, San Diego: Predicting What Will Happen When We Act: What Evidence Can Help

Gusfield Lecture in Sociology, UCSD: The Long Road from "It Works Somewhere" to "It Will Work for Us"

Linus Pauling Memorial Lecture, Institute for Science, Engineering and Public Policy: From Science to Policy: What's so good about Evidence?

Causation in Epidemiology, Epidemiology, Risk and Genomics seminar series, Cambridge University: The Long Road from "It Works Somewhere" to "It Will Work for Us"

PSA Presidential Address, Montreal, Canada: Will this Policy Work for You? Predicting Effectiveness Better: How philosophy helps

Causality in Biomedical and Social Sciences Conference, Erasmus University: RCTs: How Do We Know What to Conclude?

Seoul National University: The Long Road from Scientific Evidence to Evidence-Based Policy

Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea: Queen Physics - What is the Stretch of Her Domain?

God and Physics and an 80th birthday celebration of the work of John Polkinghorne conference, Ian Ramsey Centre, Oxford: Queen Physics – How Much of the Globe is Painted Red?

Statistics and Evidence Conference, London School of Economics: Who's Afraid of External Validity?

University of Vienna: How to Do Things with Causes

Philosophy of Physics Seminar, University of Oxford: Who's Afraid of External Validity

Labour Economics Seminar, London School of Economics: The Long Road from "It Works Somewhere" to "It Will Work for Us"

Progress in Medicine Conference, Bristol University: The Long Road from "It Works Somewhere" to "It Will Work for Us"

CPNSS 20th Anniversary Seminar, London School of Economics: What Kind of God Creates the Hodge-Podge of Nature?

US National Research Council Conference on Common Metrics: The Theory of Measurement, with Norman Bradburn

Economics Faculty, Oxford University: The Long Road from “It Works Somewhere” to “It Will Work for Us”

Birkbeck Philosophy Society: How to Make Causal Laws Useful: Build Yourself an Engine

European Science Foundation Philosophy for Science in Use Conference, Stockholm, Sweden: The Long Road from “It Works Somewhere” to “It Will Work for Us”

Conference on Causality, Amsterdam: Predicting Effectiveness

Department of Epidemiology & Public Health Seminar Series, Imperial College London: Causal Inference in Experimental and Observational Science

Multiplicity and Unification in Statistics and Probability Conference, University of Kent: Reducing Errors in Predicting Effects: (Way) Beyond Statistics

Philosophy and HPS Department Seminar Series, Hebrew University of Jerusalem: Causation: What Can Be the Use of It?

Israel Academy of Sciences Science-for-Policy Luncheon: The Long Road from Scientific Evidence to Evidence-Based Policy

Bar-Hillel Colloquium, Tel Aviv University: Evidence for Evidence-Based Policy: So What's Evidence